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This paper describes an architectural modeling tool (called “Eagle6”) that was developed to support the 
Navy’s Software System Safety Technical Review Panel (SSSTRP) evaluation process. The Eagle6 tool is 
based on the Monterey Phoenix (MP) modeling methodology and has the capability to create and verify 
system architecture models, check formal assertions via pre-defined macro commands, and has a 
visualization tool that generates graphical representations of model’s behavior (scenarios). The Eagle6 
toolset has two scenario generation modes: exhaustive search for model verification within scope, and 
random trace generation for statistical estimates of non-functional properties, like performance. The paper 
demonstrates how the Eagle6 tool can improve the SSSTRP evaluation process by use of formal assertions 




Naval gunship software system architecture requires consideration for loss of life [6]. The US Navy's 
Software System Safety Technical Review Panel (SSSTRP) evaluates potential software systems for US 
Navy gunships during the initial acquisition process. The SSSTRP organization has identified an 
unacceptable rate of software acquisition evaluation failures due to issues related to software safety [7]. 
The high failure rate often results in the requirement of the vendor to submit additional documentation and 
an acquisition process (and timeline) that is unacceptable to the US Navy acquisition community. 
 
II. Expected Contributions 
 
Eagle6 is a software tool that uses MP’s formal architectural modeling methodology to test software 
architecture [1] and can generate all possible scenarios within scope, and then checking the scenarios for 
assertion violations. Eagle6 models provide high-level abstractions for representing the structure, behavior, 
and key properties of a software system relative to interaction between the software system and its 
environment. MP models use events to describe system components behavior. 
 
In an MP model, events have attributes that enable the modeler to refine the model representation of 
system behavior. Attributes represent a detailed (and measurable) application state, thereby enabling the 
evaluation of formal assertions. This paper demonstrates how Eagle6 is able to test the high-level 
relationships between gunship systems, while continuing to support model refinement to reflect a more 
detailed (and evolving) system view. 
 
Expected contributions of our research to the gunship software safety domain are as follows: 
 
• First Gunship Case Study -- Our research produced the first publicly available gunship model in 
MP. The gunship model has been made available to the US Navy and is available on the web for 
public scrutiny. 
• Extension of MP -- Our research extended the MP methodology to include pre-defined query 
macros as methods for assertion checking. 
• The beta version of MP Commercial Product -- Eagle6 was created and made available to the 
general public (www.eagle6.com). Our web-based interface includes tutorials, modeling examples, 
and a section that is dedicated to the introduction to MP. 
• Assertion Checking & Performance Estimates via Macro Queries -- The Eagle6 Prototype 
executes an exhaustive search through all possible scenarios (up to the scope limit). Eagle6 also 
has the ability to validate assertions about system behavior.  
 
III. Research Approach 
 
The research was initiated by a request to the U.S. Navy to view the previous three years (2007-2009) of 
SSSTRP findings related to naval gun systems. The Navy Program Office approved this request to release 
non-sensitive SSSTRP results and sent a subset of three years of SSSTRP findings.  The SSSTRP findings 
are made up of opinions, reports, and recommendations to the WSESRB. Detailed analysis of the issues 
identified in the SSSTRP evaluation process are documented within the final report [7].  Our research 
found several areas of concern: 
• The SSSTRP is unable to sufficiently test potential naval gunship software solutions during the 
acquisition process. 
• TDP requirements are not structured in such a way that supports a standardized method of evaluation. 
• TDP evaluation model is not structured in such a way that supports a formal method for evaluating 
software safety issues. 
 
The main recommendation that can be derived from this research process is that the SSSTRP review 
process should be improved with the introduction of a software safety modeling methodology that can be 
used by both the SSSTRP panel and the software vendors to evaluate software safety. The evaluation 
methodology recommendations resulted in the requirement to build modeling software that has the 
following major characteristics: 
 
 User interface capable of executing formal assertions via query macros 
 Formal verification of model properties  
 Modeling methodology capable of creating abstract models that can be refined as the knowledge of 
the system matures 
 Scenario viewer that is capable of abstract views for any/all system states  
 
A. Gunship Model 
The U.S. Navy gun system diagram used for this research was provided by the U.S. Navy's 
Weapons Explosive Review Board (WESERB) as part of the documentation that accompanies this 
research. The gunship contains 17 separate systems, all connected through a single network. The gunship 
was modeled using Monterey Phoenix methodology. The modeling application, herein referred to as 
"Eagle6," is the product of this research. The Eagle6 application accepts MP modeling language and gives 
the user the ability to dynamically write formal queries that return specific sets of scenarios. Eagle6 uses an 
exhaustive and probabilistic approaches to generating scenarios (explained in detail later in this paper). The 
gunship model used for this research can be found on our Eagle6 prototype website, www.eagle6.com, as 
well as detailed descriptions of model components and associated MP tutorials. 
 
B. Review of MP 
1. MP Scenario (Event trace) 
An event is an abstraction of any detectable action performed by the system or its environment. A 
scenario (event trace)  is a set of events of different types and two binary relations between events (IN and 
PRECEDES). 
 
Figure 1: Monterey Phoenix Event Relationship 
 
MP Event Grammar requires a minimum of one ROOT event (R): 
R: {A B C} – ROOT event R contains UNORDERED events of A, B, and C 
R: (A B C) – ROOT event R contains ORDERED events of A, B, and C 
R: {* A *} – ROOT event R has > 0 number of unordered A events 
R: (* A *) – ROOT event R has > 0 number of ordered A events 
R: [A] – ROOT event R may contain OPTIONAL event A 
R: (A | B | C) – ROOT event R contains either A or B or C 
 
SHARE ALL – Grammar rule that enables multiple events to share a single event 
Note: For more details about MP event grammar, see Auguston, 2009[1]. 
 
SCHEMA Send_Receive_Activity:  
_________________________ 
 ROOT Connector: (* Send Receive *); 
 ROOT TaskA: (* Send *); 
 ROOT TaskB: (* Receive *); 
___________________________________________________ 
 TaskA, Connector SHARE ALL Send; 
 TaskB, Connector SHARE ALL Receive; 
 
The constraints section uses the predicate SHARE ALL, which is defined as X, Y are root events, and Z is 
an event type: 
 
X, Y SHARE ALL Z  { v: Z | v IN X} = {w: Z | w IN Y} 
 
 
Figure 2: Scenario Generated from MP Schema: Send_Receive 
C. MP Attributes 
There are two types of attributes, static and dynamic. Static attributes are values that are set at the 
beginning of a model and do not change. Dynamic attributes have a value that can change in different parts 
of the scenario. The Eagle6 prototype uses static attributes that enable query language. Dynamic attributes 
are reserved for future research. 
 
D. MP Expansion Scope Construct 
The purpose of the expansion scope is to limit the size of the "*" rule in order to better define the 
scenario’s parameters. For example, if the test scenario requires the gunship to fire 3 rounds, the scenario’s 
scope is set to “3,” thereby removing the infinite (“*”) default parameter. In the absence of an expansion 
scope that is detailed in the model design, setting this value will result in a finite number of scenarios. 
 
MP language by setting an expansion scope each time the “*” rule is defined as: 
  (* expression *) 
<n> is considered an abbreviation for <0-n>. 
 
The below example MP code contains a scenario that contains naval guns, with each gun firing at a target.  
The test scenario represented in MP is as follows: 
 A minimum of 1 gun system, and a maximum of 2 gun systems 
 Each weapon can fire 0, 1, or 2 times, maximum. 




ROOT Gunship_Cycle_Test: { * <1-2> Gun_System *}; 
Gun_System: (* <2> Shoot *); 
Shoot: (Load Fire (Hit | Miss)); 
 
The above MP code is described as follows: 
MP Code: "ROOT Gunship_Cycle_Test: { * <1-2> Gun_System *}; 
Description: The initiating event (ROOT) is called the Gunship_Cycle_Test.  The Gunship_Cycle_Test 
event has 1-2 Gun_System events. 
 
MP Code: "Gun_System: (* <0-2> Shoot *); 
Description: The Gun_System has 0, 1, or 2 Shoot events. 
 
MP Code: "Shoot: (Load Fire (Hit | Miss));" 
Description: The Shoot event has one event that ends in a Hit or Miss event. 
 
The above MP code resulted in a total of 20 possible scenarios, with the scenario containing the least 
number of events being 10, and the largest being 19: 
 
 
Figure 3: SCHEMA: Gunship_SSSTRP_Testing Results 
 
 
Figure 4: Scenario Generated from MP Schema: Gunship_Cycle_Test #3 
 
 
Figure 5: Scenario Generated from MP Schema: Gunship_Cycle_Test Scenario #20 
E. Small Scope Hypothesis 
The gunship model uses event grammar and includes the ability to execute exhaustive testing for 
scenario generation within scope. Our hypothesis of finding unsafe system states using a small scope size is 
based on Jackson’s Small Scope Hypothesis [2] which argues that a high proportion of bugs can be found 
by testing the system within a small scope. The ability to introduce environmental events such as missiles, 
power outages, and system failure in small scope testing [1] showed that MP is able to introduce critical 
environmental events that have a high probability of rendering the gun system unsafe. 
 
 
Figure 6: Jackson's Small Scope Hypothesis 
Jackson's Small Scope Hypothesis is demonstrated in Eagle6. Eagle6 has two primary means for 
evaluating software safety using relatively small scope sizes: 
 
 Exhaustive Search--The process of generating all possible scenarios from the MP model up to a 
given scope. The exhaustive search enables the user to find scenarios that produce counter-
examples of assertions. 
 Random Approach--Eagle6 generates random scenarios within scope to calculate statistical 
estimates. The purpose of this functionality is to create estimates that are used for software safety 
assessments. 
 
Summary: The above graph represents the hypothesis that an exhaustive test within a small scope is much 
better than an unstructured test with arbitrary test parameters. 
 
F. Assertion Checking via Macro Commands 
Eagle6 processes the MP model and generates all possible scenarios within the model scope. This list of 
scenarios is examined for assertion violations, and for each found violation returns a list of assertion 
counter examples. Figure 1 is a scenario that is generated using macro commands (queries) against the 
gunship MP model. Macro commands can be executed in three predefined formats as individual or 
combined operations: 
 EventCount(EventType, Operator, Value) - used to return only scenarios that have a min/max 
number of specific events. 
 MaxSliceSum(AttributeName, Operator, Value) - used to return only scenarios that have a 
min/max number of parallel events. 
 MaxChainSum(AttributeName, Operator, Value) - used to return only scenarios that have a 
min/max number of events that happen in sequence within the scenario. 
 
The macro query in Figure 7: Scenario Generated from MP Schema Gun_Console_Computer represents 
the process the Gun Console Computer (GCC) executes to track target data. The GCC_activity sets target 
info and starts sending the tracking data to the Command and Decision (CD) system. The GCC also 
requests more info from the 3D Radar (R3D). If any of these events fail, the event trace may end in the 
GCC being unable to track the target: 
 
Figure 7: Scenario Generated from MP Schema Gun_Console_Computer 
 
Figure 7: Scenario Generated from MP Schema Gun_Console_Computer represents two steps of 
an Eagle6 process. The first step is to set the scenario filter macro commands to be run against the model in 
order to return all scenarios that meet query conditions. The second is a scenario that was returned from the 
preceding macro command. 
 
G. Formal Verification of Model Properties 
 
We recommend the SSSTRP evaluation process require a formal verification process that 
evaluates all possible scenarios within the model scope. Eagle6 is able to generate all possible scenarios 
within scope while simultaneously evaluating the model for assertion violations. In the example in Figure 
8: Macro Command Scenario Generation: GCC_openFireFailed an unsafe state was considered, this is 
defined to be any scenario where the Gun Console Computer (GCC) sends an OpenFire command that 




Figure 8: Macro Command Scenario Generation: GCC_openFireFailed Results 
 
This scenario demonstrates Eagle6 has the ability to execute formal assertions via a pre-defined macro 
interface. 
 
Figure 9: Macro Command Scenario Generation: GCC_openFireFailed 
 
IV. Identifying Potential Software Safety Hazard States 
When modeling the naval gunship system, we used both exhaustive and random scenario generation 
(See Section E above for definition of exhaustive and random scenario generation).  
 
The exhaustive search method enables the user to input query criteria that customizes the result set returned 
by the Eagle6 tool. Limiting result sets to important scenarios enables users to see only the data in which 
they are interested.  
 
A. Modeling Demonstration: QUERY GunshipMaxPower 
Hazard State: Find scenarios where the gunship system may require more power than the gunship can 
produce. 
 
Test Definition:  Return all scenarios within scope that have at least one slice that contains events that 
have the attribute MaxVoltagePower, and the sum of the attribute MaxVoltagePower  is >= 220. 
 
Macro Command: 
ResultSet = MaxSliceSum(MaxVoltagePower, >=, 220) 
  




Figure 11: QUERY GunshipMaxPower - Results 
 
The above graphic contains the following information: 
 Graphic Display - A hyperlink that is programmed to display the graphical image of the scenario 
in a new browser. 
 Total Event Count - The total number of events that are included in the scenario. 
 In Count - Total number of events that have the IN relationship with another event. 




Figure 12: Scenario Generated from QUERY GunshipMaxPower - Graphical Display 
The below graph represents a close-up view of the events that are identified in the above 
MaxSliceSum Query:  
 
Figure 13: Scenario Generated from QUERY GunshipMaxPower - Zoom Slice View 
 
Summary: The query demonstration showed the query returned 5 possible scenarios where the gunship 
could require power greater than 220.  The slice from the above scenario contains the following events:  
 
Events (Sum of MaxVoltagePower = 290) 
 CD_wait_GCC_openFire(10).MaxVoltagePower =5  
 GCC_wait_GMP_openFire(22).MaxVoltagePower =5  
 GMCP_wait_GMP_ossData(29).MaxVoltagePower =10  
 GMP_wait_CDC_ossData(36).MaxVoltagePower =50  
 CDC_wait_EOD_ossData(41).MaxVoltagePower =100  
 EOD_receiveDaylightSensorData(46).MaxVoltagePower =120 
 
B. Modeling Demonstration: QUERY Network_Capacity_Check 
Hazard State: Find scenarios where the gunship system may require more network bandwidth than the 
gunship network can provide. 
 
Test Description: Find a set of scenarios that have at least one slice with the following property: the sum 
of the attribute Max_Network_Bandwidth for all events that belong to that slice must be >= 5. 
 
Macro Command: 
MaxSliceSum(Max_Network_Bandwidth, >=, 5)  
   
 
Figure 14: QUERY Network_Capacity_Check - Scenario Query 
 
 
Figure 15: QUERY Network_Capacity_Check - Results
 
Figure 16: Scenario Generated from QUERY Network_Capacity_Check - Graphical Display 
 
Summary: The query demonstration showed the query returned 4 possible scenarios where the gunship 
network could require bandwidth greater than 5MB, with a single scenario demonstrated above. Below is a 
list of events contained in the slice (that satisfied the query) from the above scenario: 
 
 Events (Sum of Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB: 5.5)  
 CD_wait_GCC_openFire(10).Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB =0.2  
 GCC_wait_GMP_openFire(22).Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB =0.3  
 GMCP_wait_GMP_ossData(31).Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB =0.5  
 GMP_wait_CDC_ossData(39).Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB =0.5  
 CDC_wait_EOD_ossData(44).Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB =1  
 EOD_receiveDaylightSensorData(49).Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB =3 
 
C. Model Demonstration: QUERY GCC_OpenFireFail 
Hazard State: Find scenarios where the gunship system may experience the failure of a Gun Control 
Center Open Fire Command. 
 
Test Definition: Find a set of possible hazard state scenarios where the CGG_openFire event happens at 
least once.  
 
Macro Command: 
ResultSet = EventCount(GCC_openFireFailed, >=, 1)   
 
 
Figure 17: QUERY GCC_OpenFireFail - Scenario Query 
 
Figure 18: QUERY GCC_OpenFireFail - Results
 
Figure 19: Scenario Generated from QUERY GCC_OpenFireFail - Graphical Display 
 
Summary: The query demonstration showed the query returned 9 possible scenarios where the 
GCC_openFireFailure event happened at least once. 
 
 
D. RANDOM GENERATION DEMONSTRATION: 
The below model demonstrates how to set the probability of an event. In the test below it was determined 
that the event Radar_Target_Identified had two possible outcomes: Enemy_Target and Friendly_Target. To 
better model the operational environment, the modeler assigned the probability of an Enemy_Target being 
identified 60% more often than a Friendly_Target. Consider the following model: 
 
 SCHEMA: Radar_Target_Tracking 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 ROOT Radar_Target_Identified: ((Enemy_Target | Friendly_Target)  
     [(In_Weapon_Range Target_Lock)]  
     (* <1-3> Target_Ready_For_Fire *)); 
Set following probabilities: 
 60% probability of event Enemy_Target happening instead of event Friendly_Target 
 33.3% probability of events In_Weapon_Range and Target_Lock to appear  
 20% probability of event Target_Ready_For_Fire to appear 1 time 
 30% probability of event Target_Ready_For_Fire to appear 2 times 
 50% probability of event Target_Ready_For_Fire to appear 3 times 
The following model represents the above system modeling requirements: 
 
 SCHEMA: Radar_Target_Tracking 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 ROOT Radar_Target_Identified: ((Enemy_Target | <0.40> Friendly_Target)  
   [<0.33> (In_Weapon_Range Target_Lock)]  
   (*<1-3/0.20,0.30,0.50> Target_Ready_For_Fire *)); 
 
To further refine our Assertion, we set the below macro query to return only scenarios that have a minimum of 
1 Target_Lock event: 
 
Eagle6 Scenario Generation Results for SCHEMA: Radar_Target_Tracking 
The below graphic displays the probability of all possible scenarios using the exhaustive scenario 
generation approach.   
 
Figure 20: SCHEMA: Radar_Target_Tracking Results Showing Probability 
 
Note: If the user selects query criteria on the options page, the result set may contain probability values for 
scenarios that do not total 100%. This is due to possible scenarios having been filtered from the final result set: 
 
 
Figure 21: SCHEMA: Radar_Target_Tracking Macro Query 
 
 
Figure 22: Model Results Showing Probability 
 
The results of the Radar_Target_Identified event, after applying the above filter, were a record set of 6 
possible scenarios, with a probability of 33% that one of the 6 events will occur. 
 
E. Random Generation Demonstration 




 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 ROOT Radar_Target_Identified: ((Enemy_Target | <0.40> Friendly_Target)  
   [<0.33> (In_Weapon_Range Target_Lock)]  
   (*<1-3/0.20,0.30,0.50> Target_Ready_For_Fire *)); 
 
To generate random scenario generation, the user must select the "Random Scenario Generation" link at the top 
of the options page: 
 
 
Figure 23 Random Scenario Generation Options 
 
Model Results 
In the below graphic, Eagle6 displays how many times each scenario was generated and the probability for 
each scenario (calculated using the total number of scenarios and the number of times each scenario appeared). 
 
Figure 24 Model Results Showing Probability for 1000 Generated Scenarios 
  
 
F. Model Demonstration Summary 
The above demonstrations show how the system and environment can be modeled with specific focus on 
the ability to model system behavior. This capability is especially helpful in the SSSTRP software safety domain as 
the need exists to not only check for potential software hazard states, but also create domain models that enable the 
testing of potential software with realistic environmental events, and the probabilities associated with those events. 
This approach is much more refined and allows for domain models to better reflect the operational behavior in 
which the systems function. 
 
V. Gunship Case Study Evaluation 
 
The initial MP framework was applied to the Navy gunship software safety domain and tested using an MP 
compiler developed by this research team (www.Eagle6.com). The tool has created an executable code that bridged 
the gap between concept and design and proved to be critical during the testing and evaluation process. The products 
generated from this research are available on the internet under the “Gunship Model” link at www.eagle6.com, and 
project members are receiving feedback on a daily basis. To this point the project has modeled a gunship software 
system using Eagle6 and is able to test for unsafe states using this software. 
 
Environment Behavior – Evaluating a gunship system requires the ability to model the system and its 
environment. Formally testing a system's functional profile while introducing external behavioral events is critical to 
understanding how the system will react in a combat situation. Eagle6 introduces the capability for the SSSTRP to 
generate hypothetical environmental events to test for unsafe system states. 
 
Performance Estimates – Early in the design process, non-functional requirements need to be tested in order to 
see how the integration of a system will impact the overall System of Systems (SoS). Creating a single SoS MP 
model prior to the acquisition process enables the acquisition community to standardize the vendor response 
questionnaire, thereby resulting in a formal method of evaluating potential software solutions. Furthermore, 
incorporating a technical questionnaire that elicits MP model input responses from potential vendors is expected to 
streamline the vendor's response efforts as well as the evaluation methodology. 
 
Model Views – The SSSTRP evaluation team can extract representations of the model in visual and textual views 
in order to communicate the results to both technical and non-technical SSSTRP members. 
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